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Abstract—Motivated by many existing security and privacy
applications, e.g., network traffic attribution, linkage attacks,
private web search, and feature-based data de-anonymization,
in this paper, we study the Feature-based Data Inferability (FDI)
quantification problem. First, we conduct the FDI quantification
under both naive and general data models from both a feature
distance perspective and a feature distribution perspective. Our
quantification explicitly shows the conditions to have a desired
fraction of the target users to be Top-K inferable (K is an integer
parameter). Then, based on our quantification, we evaluate
the user inferability in two cases: network traffic attribution
in network forensics and feature-based data de-anonymization.
Finally, based on the quantification and evaluation, we discuss the
implications of this research for existing feature-based inference
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many existing security and privacy applications/techniques
can be characterized as a feature-based inference system, e.g.,
network traffic attribution in network forensic applications,
private web search, feature-based data de-anonymization [1]-
[8]. To conduct network traffic attribution, usually, a network
traffic attribution system is first learned based on the features
extracted from historical network traces. Later, when new
network traffic comes, features will be extracted from the
new traffic first, and then the data will be automatically
attributed to the users who generated them by the system
based on the features (as shown in Fig.1) [1]. In fact, the
network traffic attribution system can be directly considered
as a feature-based inference system, where the system is
first learned based on the historical/training data (in detail,
features of the historical/training) and then used to infer
the new data (in this scenario, users who generate the new
traffic) based on their features (as shown in Fig.2). Another
example is the code stylometry-based de-anonymization attack
to programmers proposed in [6]. In this kind of attack, the code
stylometry features of training programs are first extracted
to train a de-anonymization model. Then, this model can be
used to de-anonymize the programmers of the target programs
based on their code stylometry features. For this example, the
code stylometry-based de-anonymization model can also be
considered as a feature-based inference system to infer (de-
anonymize) target data (programmers of targeting programs).
Now, some interesting questions are brought: how to quan-
tify the performance of those feature-based inference sys-
tems for security and privacy applications? and what is the
performance of existing feature-based inference techniques
relative to the inherent theoretical performance bound? An-
swering these questions are important to accurately evaluate
and understand the performance of existing feature-based
inference systems/techniques and further develop improved
ones. Unfortunately, although we already have many feature-
based inference systems/techniques for various security and
privacy applications, the answers to the brought questions
remain unclear. Therefore, to address these open problems,
in this paper, we study the Feature-based Data Inferability
(FDI) quantification for existing feature-based inference sys-
tems/techniques in various security and privacy applications.
Particularly, we make the following contributions in this paper.
• We first quantify the FDI under a naive data model,
where each user-feature relationship is characterized by
a binary function (a user either has a feature or does
have a feature). Under the naive model, we quantified the
conditions to have a target dataset to be (δ,K)-inferable,
i.e., to have δm˜ target users to be Top-K inferable, where
δ is a parameter in [0, 1], m˜ is the number of overlapped
users between the training data of the inference model
and the targeting data, (thus, δm˜ is the number of users
that can be correctly Top-K inferred), and K is an integer
specifying the desired inference accuracy.
• Subsequently, we extend our FDI quantification to a gen-
eral data model. Under the general data model, we quan-
tify the FDI from both the feature distance perspective
and the feature distribution perspective to have a target
dataset to be (δ,K)-inferable. Our quantification in the
general scenarios provides the answers to the raised open
problems, and meanwhile, our quantification provides
the theoretical foundation for the first time for existing
feature-based inference systems in various security and
privacy applications, to the best of our knowledge.
• Based on our FDI quantification, we conduct a large-scale
evaluation leveraging on real world data. Specifically, we
evaluate the user inferability in two cases: network traffic
attribution in network forensics and feature-based data
de-anonymization. We explicitly demonstrate the (δ,K)-
inferability of users in these two cases and analyze the
reasons.
• In terms of our quantification and evaluation, we discuss
the implications of this paper to practical feature-based
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Fig. 1. Network traffic attribution system.
inference systems/techniques. We also point out the future
research directions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we describe the motivation applications and formalize the
problem. In Section III, we quantify the FDI under both naive
and general data models. In Section IV, we evaluate the FDI
in two scenarios. We make further discussion in Section V. In
Section VI, we summarize the related work and we conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMALIZATION
In this section, we formalize the studied problem. To make
the problem easily understandable and to further motivate our
research, we start from introducing motivation examples that
our study is applicable for analysis.
A. Motivation Examples
In this paper, we study data’s feature-based inferability. Our
study is motivated by several existing security and privacy
applications, e.g., network traffic attribution in network secu-
rity forensics [1][2][3], linkage attacks and private web search
[4][5], and data de-anonymization [6][7][8].
Network traffic attribution is one of the fundamental issues
in network security forensics, under which users, who are
responsible for the observed activities and behaviors on net-
work interfaces, are inferred [1][3]. Taking the network traffic
attribution system Kaleido proposed in [1] and shown in Fig.1
as an example, a typical network traffic attribution system
works as follows: 1©, based on the historical network traces, a
set of features (corresponding to each user) are extracted; 2©,
a learning model is designed to learn a discriminant model
based on the features of historical network traces, which is
used for network traffic attribution and/or new user (could
be an intruder) identification; 3©, when new network traffic
comes, the features of the new network traffic are extracted;
and 4©, taking the features of the new network traffic as input,
the discriminant model either attributes the traffic to a set of
candidate users or concludes that the traffic is generated by a
new user (a set of new users).
Web searching is one of the most fundamental computer
applications, by which users obtain desired knowledge and/or
find interested websites. Intuitively, users’ web search traces
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Fig. 2. System architecture of the motivation applications.
carry users’ interests and intents. Therefore, potential adver-
saries (e.g., eavesdroppers) may design some linkage attacks
and exploit users’ web search traces to infer users’ profiles and
other sensitive information [4][5]. The key idea of a linkage
attack is that (i) an adversary first learns a linkage function
based on the features of target users’ historical web search data
and then (ii) determines whether the new generated web search
data/events belong to the target users. To defend against the
linkage attack in web search applications, several obfuscation
mechanisms have been proposed for private web search [4][5].
The basic idea is to obfuscates users’ web search data by
adding some noise, i.e., obfuscating the features of users’ web
search data such that the linkage attack cannot effectively infer
the generator of the data.
Our study in this paper is also motivated by existing
feature-based de-anonymization attacks and techniques, e.g.,
programmers de-anonymization [6], authorship distribution to
underground forums and multi-author detection [7], and movie
rating data de-anonymization [8]. In these de-anonymization
attacks/techniques, a feature-based de-anonymization model is
first learned based on a training dataset. Subsequently, the new
coming data (generated by an existing user or a new user) are
de-anonymized by the de-anonymization model based on the
data’s features.
Mathematically, all the aforementioned security and privacy
applications can be reduced to a simple yet general system as
shown in Fig.2: 1©, a model is learned based on the features
of historical data; 2©, the target data are input to the model;
and 3©, inferences, e.g., candidate users who generate the data
and/or identified new users, are concluded based on the results
of the learned model. Now, after observing the success of the
aforementioned security and privacy applications [1]-[8], e.g.,
Kaleido is able to identify the responsible users with over
80% accuracy, two interesting questions are that why these
techniques/attacks are success and given the target data, how to
determine the performance of these techniques/attacks relative
to the intrinsic inferability of the target data, e.g., how good
the 80% accuracy of Kaleido is and is that possible to achieve
some better accuracy than 80%? To answer the two questions,
we study the intrinsic inferability of the target data given the
historical data (training data). Therefore, our research in this
paper can serve as the theoretical foundation of the afore-
mentioned security and privacy applications. Furthermore, our
quantification enables the development of a tool to evaluate the
relative performance of the aforementioned techniques/attacks
and guides the development of future research (as discussed
in Section V).
2
B. Problem Formalization and Models
Now, we formalize the studied problem. During the formal-
ization, the basic principle is to make the problem sufficiently
general and meanwhile mathematically tractable.
We denote the training data (e.g., the historical data in the
network traffic attribution scenario) as U . Since we do not
distinguish a user and the data generated by that user, we
assume U consists of n users (or the data generated by n
users), and further assume U = {ui|i = 1, 2, · · · , n}, where
ui is a user (or the data generated by a user). For ∀ui ∈ U , it
represents a user or the data generated by a user depending on
the context. To model the feature extraction process (as shown
in Fig.1 and Fig.2), we assume there is a feature extraction
mechanism F = {f1, f2, · · · , fN} 1, where f i denotes some
particular feature function and N is the dimension of the
feature space. Applying F to U , we can get the features
of U , denoted by set F(U). In this paper, we focus on the
scenario that F(U) is a finite set, i.e., N is some finite value2.
Specifically, for ∀ui ∈ U , its features with respect to F are
denoted by vector
−−−→F(ui) =< f1ui , f2ui , · · · , fNui >, where fkui
(1 ≤ k ≤ N) denotes the feature of ui with respect to the
feature function fk ∈ F .
Similar to formalizing the training data and taking account
of the security and privacy applications ([1]-[8]), we denote
the target data by V = {vj |j = 1, 2, · · · ,m}, where vj is a
user (or the data generated by a target user) in the target data
and m is the number of users in the target data. As shown
in Fig.1 and Fig.2 ([1]-[8]), before inferring the users in V ,
we apply the same F to extract the features of V denoted by
F(V ), which is again assumed to be a finite set. For ∀vj ∈ V ,
its features with respect to F are denoted by vector −−−→F(vj) =<
f1vj , f
2
vj , · · · , fNvj >, where fkvj denotes the feature of vj with
respect to the feature function fk ∈ F . After having F(V ),
the task now is to infer the users in V using an inference
model (e.g., the network traffic discriminant model as shown
in Fig.1).
Based on the aforementioned definitions, the studied prob-
lem in this paper can be formalized as follows:
Definition II.1. Feature-based Data Inferability (FDI). Given
U , V , and F , we quantify the inferability of V with respect
to U and F .
In this paper, we study the intrinsic FDI of the security and
privacy applications as shown Section II-A. Mathematically,
the FDI study can serve as the theoretical foundation of the
applications in Section II-A, e.g., the network traffic distri-
bution system Kaleido proposed in [1]. Practically, the FDI
study can be employed to evaluate the relative performance
1In practice, F could be any specific feature extraction mechanism, e.g.,
the ones in [1]-[8].
2With this assumption, the studied problem is still sufficiently general to
be applied to many existing security and privacy applications. For instance, in
network security forensics [1][2][3], linkage attacks and private web search
[4][5], and data de-anonymization [6][7][8], the extracted features of the
training data can be modeled by a finite set.
of the existing techniques in the applications of Section II-A,
and guide the development of new/improved techniques.
III. FDI QUANTIFICATION
In this section, we conduct the FDI quantification. We start
the quantification from a naive scenario. Then, we generalize
the FDI quantification to the more practical cases.
To make our following discussion easily understandable,
we use the network traffic attribution application in network
security forensics as the studying context without of dedicated
specification in the rest of this paper. Straightforwardly, our
discussion is applicable to the scenarios of the linkage attack
and private web search [4][5] and data de-anonymization
[6][7][8].
A. Preliminary
Following the security and privacy applications in [1]-[8], an
inferring model can be learned from F(U) as shown in Fig.1
and Fig.2, e.g., the discriminant model in the network security
forensics application [1][3], the linkage attack model in private
web searching [4][5], and the de-anonymization model in
[6][7][8]. We denote the inference (attack, de-anonymization)
model by M. Then, M is employed to infer the new coming
data, i.e., the target data.
When employingM to infer users (data generated by users)
in the target data,M employs some inference function learned
from F(U). We here model the inference function of M by
φ(·, ·). Then, ∀vj ∈ V , when inferring vj usingM, we denote
the process by M(vj : U) and denote the inference result
by M(vj : U) = {ui|ui ∈ U, φ(ui, vj) returns true} ∪ {4},
where 4 denotes a new user (the data generated by a new
user) such that 4 /∈ U . We further explain the inference
result definition as follows: when employing M to infer the
target user (data generated by the target user) vj , it may be
inferred to some candidate users in the training data U if the
inference function φ(·, ·) is satisfied. Otherwise, M is more
confident to infer vj as a new user that never appeared in
U . For instance, in the network traffic distribution application,
when using Kaleido (M in our definition) to monitor the on-
line network traffic, the inference result could be that the traffic
is generated by some existing user (used for training Kaleido)
or the traffic is generated by some new user that not appeared
before (could be some intruder). Now, we are ready to start
our quantification.
B. Warmup: Naive Quantification
In this subsection, we conduct the FDI quantification for
a naive scenario, where we assume that ∀fk ∈ F , fk is a
binary feature function, i.e., ∀ui ∈ U or ∀vj ∈ V , ui or
vj either has feature fk or not. Then, we have ∀w ∈ U ∪
V ,
−−−→F(w) =< fkw|fkw ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, 2, · · · , N >, i.e., the
feature vector of w is a N -dimensional 0-1 vector with respect
to F . Furthermore, for −−−→F(w), we define Γw =
N∑
k=1
fkw. Given
two 0-1 vectors
−−−→F(x) and −−−→F(y) where x, y ∈ U∪V , we define
3
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Fig. 3. Feature space partition.
−−−−−−→F(x⊕ y) =< fkx ⊕ fky |k = 1, 2, · · · , N >, where ⊕ is the
logical binary XOR operation.
For v ∈ V and u ∈ U , we denote v ' u the scenario that
v and u correspond to the same user (or the data generated
by the same user) and v 6= u otherwise, e.g., the network
traffic generated by the same user in different time windows
or not. To conduct the FDI quantification, the first step is to
understand and quantify the correlation of the features of v
and u. Toward this objective, for v ∈ V and u ∈ U , we
assume that Pr(fkv = f
k
u |v ' u) = p for 1 ≤ k ≤ N , i.e.,
the probability that v preserves the same property of u with
respect to a feature is p. Now, for u,w ∈ U and v ∈ V ,
suppose v ' u while v 6= w. Then, we have the following
lemma, which quantifies the inferability of v with respect to
u and w3.
Lemma 1. If p 6= 1/2 and Γu⊕w ≥ 16 lnN+8(1−2p)2 , then ∃M such
that M(v : {u,w}) = {u}, i.e., v is inferable with respect to
u and w.
Proof: To prove this lemma, we first analyze the differ-
ence between Γv⊕w and Γv⊕u. To facilitate our analysis, we
partition the feature space F into four disjoint subsets with
respect to F(u) and F(w), denoted by F1, F2, F3, and F4
respectively as shown in Fig.3, where F1 = {fk|fku = 1, fkw =
0} (the set of features that u has while w dose not have),
F2 = {fk|fku = fkw = 1} (the set of features that both u
and w have), F3 = {fk|fku = 0, fkw = 1} (the set of features
that u does have while w has), and F4 = {fk|fku = fkw = 0}
(the set of features that neither u nor w has). Let ki = |Fi| for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where |·| is the cardinality of a set. Furthermore,
for x ∈ {u,w, v} and 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, let −−−→Fi(x) be the feature
vector of x with respect to the features in Fi. Evidently,
−−−→Fi(x)
is a subvector of
−−−→F(x). Furthermore, let Γix =
∑
fk∈Fi
fkx . Then,
it is easy to show that ∀x, y ∈ {u,w, v}, Γx⊕y =
4∑
i=1
Γix⊕y .
Let Λvu,w = Γv⊕w − Γv⊕u. Since Γv⊕w =
4∑
i=1
Γiv⊕w and
Γv⊕u =
4∑
i=1
Γiv⊕u, we have Λ
v
u,w =
4∑
i=1
(Γiv⊕w −Γiv⊕u). Now,
we consider each Fi separately: (1) since both u and w have
3Note that, all the quantifications in this paper are statistically meaningful,
i.e., statistically, with probability of 1, the FDI quantifications hold.
the features in F2, we have Γ2v⊕w − Γ2v⊕u = 0; (2) similar
to F2, since neither u nor w has any feature in F4, we have
Γ4v⊕w − Γ4v⊕u = 0; (3) for F1, the set of features hold by u
while not w, statistically, we have Γ1v⊕u ∼ B(k1, 1 − p) and
Γ1v⊕w ∼ B(k1, p), where B(x, y) is a binomial variable with
parameters x and y; and (4) for Γ3v⊕w, the set of features hold
by w while not u, statistically, we have Γ3v⊕u ∼ B(k3, 1− p)
and Γ3v⊕w ∼ B(k3, p). Then, we have
Λvu,w
=
∑
i=1,3
(Γiv⊕w − Γiv⊕u)
statistically
= B(k1, p) +B(k3, p)−B(k1, 1− p)−B(k3, 1− p)
= B(k1 + k3, p)−B(k1 + k3, 1− p)
= B(Γu⊕w, p)−B(Γu⊕w, 1− p).
Now, we consider two cases. First, if p > 12 , we have
pΓu⊕w > (1 − p)Γu⊕w. Then, applying the Pedarsani-
Grossglauser lemma [9], we have
Pr(Λvu,w ≤ 0)
statistically
= Pr(B(Γu⊕w, p)−B(Γu⊕w, 1− p) ≤ 0)
≤ 2 exp(− (pΓu⊕w − (1− p)Γu⊕w)
2
8(pΓu⊕w + (1− p)Γu⊕w) )
= 2 exp(− (2p− 1)
2Γu⊕w
8
).
Since Γu⊕w ≥ 16 lnN+8(1−2p)2 , we have
Pr(Λvu,w ≤ 0)
statistically
≤ 2 exp(−2 lnN − 1)
≤ 1
N2
.
Then, according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma and statistically,
we have Pr(Λvu,w ≤ 0) N→∞= 0, which implies that statisti-
cally, Pr(Γv⊕w > Γv⊕u)
N→∞
= 1.
Second, we consider the case that p < 12 . In this case, we
have pΓu⊕w < (1 − p)Γu⊕w. Then, applying the Pedarsani-
Grossglauser lemma [9], we have
Pr(Λvu,w ≥ 0)
statistically
= Pr(B(Γu⊕w, p)−B(Γu⊕w, 1− p) ≥ 0)
≤ 2 exp(− ((1− p)Γu⊕w − pΓu⊕w)
2
8((1− p)Γu⊕w + pΓu⊕w) )
= 2 exp(− (1− 2p)
2Γu⊕w
8
).
Considering that Γu⊕w ≥ 16 lnN+8(1−2p)2 , we have
Pr(Λvu,w ≥ 0)
statistically
≤ 2 exp(−2 lnN − 1)
≤ 1
N2
.
According to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma and statistically, we
have Pr(Λvu,w ≥ 0) N→∞= 0, i.e., Pr(Γv⊕w < Γv⊕u) N→∞= 1.
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Algorithm 1: A naive implementation of M.
1 if p > 12 then
2 M(v : {u,w} = arg min{x|Γv⊕x, x ∈ {u,w}};
3 else if p < 12 then
4 M(v : {u,w} = arg max{x|Γv⊕x, x ∈ {u,w}};
Now, we need to show that ∃M such thatM(v : {u,w}) =
{u}. Based on our proof, it is trivial to show that (1) when
p > 12 , Pr(M(v : {u,w}) = {u})
statistically
= 1 if
M is an increasing function with respect to Γv⊕x, where
x ∈ {u,w}; and similarly, when p < 12 , Pr(M(v : {u,w}) =
{u}) statistically= 1 if M is a decreasing function with respect
to Γv⊕x. Therefore, for our purpose it is easy to design M
using existing techniques [1]-[8]. To name a naive one, we
can set M as shown in Algorithm 1. 2
In Lemma 1, we quantified the condition to successfully
infer user v from V with respect to {u,w} ⊆ U . We further
discuss Lemma 1 as follows. First, one condition is that p 6= 12 .
This is consistent with our institution. If p = 12 , the features
of each user is uniformly and equiprobably distributed in F .
Then, theoretically, all the users are equivalent with respect
to F and thus it is difficult (if not impossible) to successfully
infer v ∈ V based on the features in F by any model. Second,
when p 6= 12 , we explicitly specify the condition that v ∈ V
is statistically guaranteed to be successfully inferrable with
respect to {u,w}. In our proof, we also give how to design
M. Note that, the specified condition is sufficient while not
necessary to have v inferable with respect to {u,w}. Even if
the condition is not satisfied, it is also possible to successfully
infer v with respect to {u,w}. Particularly, we show this fact
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For v ∈ V and u,w ∈ U , suppose v ' u and
v 6= w. If p 6= 1/2, then ∃M such that Pr(M(v : {u,w}) =
{u})
statistically
≥ max{0, 1− 2 exp(− (1−2p)2Γu⊕w8 )}.
Proof: This corollary can be proven using the similar
technique as in Lemma 1. 2
In Lemma 1, we quantify the FDI of v with respect to
{u,w}. Now, we quantify the FDI of v with respect to U . In
practice, we usually infer v to a set of candidate users in U .
For instance, in the network traffic distribution system Kaleido
[1], the user responsible for the new coming traffic might be
inferred to a set of K (K ∈ [1, n]) users. Therefore, given
v ∈ V , we define the Top-K candidate set of v as follows.
Definition III.1. Top-K candidate set and Top-K inferable.
For v ∈ V , suppose that ∃u ∈ U such that u ' v. Then,
the Top-K candidate set of v (K ∈ [1, n]), denoted by Kv ,
is defined as Kv ⊆ U such that |Kv| = K and u ∈ Kv . v is
Top-K inferable with respect to U if ∃M such that M(v :
U) = Kv , i.e., M returns a subset of U with size K and u is
in that subset.
Now, we quantify the Top-K FDI of a user v ∈ V . Let Kv
be a subset of U such that |Kv| = n − K and v /∈ Kv . We
show the result in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For v ∈ V , suppose that v ' u ∈ U . Then,
v is Top-K inferable if p 6= 1/2 and ∃Kv ⊆ U such that
min{Γu⊕w|w ∈ Kv} ≥ 16 lnN+8 ln(2θn)(1−2p)2 , where θ = n−Kn .
Proof: we prove this lemma by considering two cases.
First, we consider the case that p > 12 . We define an event
E1 as ∃w ∈ Kv such that Γv⊕u ≥ Γv⊕w. Then, we have
Pr(E1) = Pr(
⋃
w∈Kv
Γv⊕u ≥ Γv⊕w) ≤
∑
w∈Kv
Pr(Γv⊕u ≥
Γv⊕w) according to Boole’s inequality. From Lemma 1, when
p > 12 , Pr(Γv⊕u ≥ Γv⊕w)
statistically
≤ 2 exp(− (2p−1)2Γu⊕w8 ).
Then, we have
Pr(E1)
statistically
≤
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(− (2p− 1)
2Γu⊕w
8
)
≤
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(−2 lnN − ln 2θn)
= 2θn exp(−2 lnN − ln 2θn) = 1/N2.
According to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have
Pr(E1)
N→∞
= 0, i.e., Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u < Γv⊕w) N→∞= 1.
Second, we consider the case that p < 12 . In this case, we
define E2 as an event that ∃w ∈ Kv such that Γv⊕u ≤ Γv⊕w.
Then, similar to the case that p > 12 , we have
Pr(E2) = Pr(
⋃
w∈Kv
Γv⊕u ≤ Γv⊕w)
≤
∑
w∈Kv
Pr(Γv⊕u ≤ Γv⊕w)
≤
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(− (1− 2p)
2Γu⊕w
8
)
≤ 1/N2.
Again, according to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have
Pr(E2)
N→∞
= 0, i.e., Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u > Γv⊕w) N→∞= 1.
Now, we discuss how to design M and how to find Kv .
Based on our proof, if p 6= 1/2 and ∃Kv ⊆ U such that
min{Γu⊕w|w ∈ Kv} ≥ 16 lnN+8 ln(2θn)(1−2p)2 , then (1) when
p > 1/2, Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u < Γv⊕w) N→∞= 1, which
implies that among U , there are at least n −K users having
their Γv⊕· values greater than Γv⊕u; and (2) when p < 1/2,
Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u > Γv⊕w) N→∞= 1, there are at least n−K
users having their Γv⊕· values smaller than Γv⊕u. According
to this observation, we give a preliminary implementation of
M as shown in Algorithm 2. Basically, if p > 1/2, Algorithm
2 returns a set Kv consisting of K users from U that have
the top-K minimum Γv⊕· values; and if p < 1/2, Algorithm
2 returns a set Kv consisting of K users from U that have
the top-K maximum Γv⊕· values. By a contradiction-based
technique, we can show that the M shown in Algorithm 2
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Algorithm 2: An implementation of M to have v Top-K
inferable.
1 Kv ← {u1, u2, · · · , uK};
2 U ′ ← U \ Kv;
3 if p > 12 then
4 for x ∈ U ′ do
5 u′ = arg max
y
{Γv⊕y|y ∈ Kv};
6 if Γv⊕u′ > Γv⊕x then
7 Kv ← Kv \ {u′};
8 Kv ← Kv ∪ {x};
9 else if p < 12 then
10 for x ∈ U ′ do
11 u′ = arg min
y
{Γv⊕y|y ∈ Kv};
12 if Γv⊕u′ < Γv⊕x then
13 Kv ← Kv \ {u′};
14 Kv ← Kv ∪ {x};
15 return Kv;
returns a Top-K candidate set of v, i.e., v is Top-K inferable.
2
In Lemma 2, the conditions for a user to be Top-K inferable
are quantified. If the specified conditions are satisfied, we also
provide an implementation of M in the proof (Algorithm 2).
In fact, there are also many other techniques to implement
M, e.g., the techniques proposed in [1]-[8]. Further, simi-
lar to Lemma 1, the conditions in Lemma 2 are sufficient
while not necessary for v to be Top-K inferable. When the
conditions are satisfied, it is statistically guaranteed that v is
Top-K inferable. Otherwise, v is still Top-K inferable with
some probability. Particularly, we show that probability in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. For v ∈ V , suppose that v ' u ∈
U . Then, if p 6= 1/2, Pr(M(v : U) = Kv) ≥
max{0, 1−2θn exp(− (1−2p)2Γmin(Kv)8 )}, where θ = n−Kn and
Γmin(Kv) = min{Γu⊕w|w ∈ Kv}.
Now, we consider an even more general scenario where we
try to infer multiple users in V . A practical application corre-
sponding to this scenario is to distribute the monitored network
traffic generated by multiple users in network forensics [1][3].
Let V˜ = {x|x ∈ V, and ∃y ∈ U, s.t. x ' y}, i.e., V˜ is a set of
users that appeared in both V and U . Furthermore, let δ be a
constant and δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we define the (δ,K)-inferability
of V (i.e., V is (δ, k)-inferable) as follows.
Definition III.2. (δ,K)-Inferable. V is (δ,K)-inferable if
there are at least δ · m˜ users in V˜ are Top-K inferable4.
Then, we quantify the (δ,K)-inferability of V in the fol-
lowing theorem.
4Without loss of generality, we assume δm˜ is an integer in [0,m]. In the
case that δm˜ is not an integer, we can define δm˜ as δm˜← bδm˜c
Theorem 1. Let Vδ be any subset of V˜ and |Vδ| = δm˜. V
is (δ,K)-inferable if p 6= 1/2 and ∀v ∈ Vδ , ∃Kv ⊆ U such
that |Kv| = n −K, and min{Γu⊕w|u ∈ U, u ' v, and w ∈
Kv} ≥ 16 lnN+8 ln(2δθm˜n)(1−2p)2 .
Proof: We first prove this theorem for the case that p > 1/2.
For v ∈ Vδ , suppose v ' u ∈ U . Evidently, |Kv| = K. Now,
to prove this theorem, it is sufficient to show that ∀v ∈ Vδ , v
is Top-K inferable. Let E be the event that ∃v ∈ Vδ such that
v is not Top-K inferable. Then, we have
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
v∈Vδ
v is not Top-K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(v is not Top-K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
(1− Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u < Γv⊕w))
=
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(∃w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u ≥ Γv⊕w)
Then, according to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
Pr(E)
statistically
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(− (2p− 1)
2Γu⊕w
8
)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(−2 lnN − ln(2δθm˜n))
=
∑
v∈Vδ
exp(ln 2θn− 2 lnN − ln(2δθm˜n))
= 1/N2.
Following the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(E) N→∞= 0,
i.e., Pr(∀v ∈ Vδ, v is Top-K inferable) N→∞= 1 which implies
that V is (δ,K)-inferable.
For the case that p < 1/2, we have
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
v∈Vδ
v is not Top-K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(v is not Top-K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
(1− Pr(∀w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u > Γv⊕w))
=
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(∃w ∈ Kv,Γv⊕u ≤ Γv⊕w).
Then, according to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
Pr(E)
statistically
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(− (1− 2p)
2Γu⊕w
8
)
≤ 1/N2.
Again, following the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have
Pr(E)
N→∞
= 0, which implies that V is (δ,K)-inferable. 2
In Theorem 1, we quantify the (δ,K)-inferability of V .
When comparing Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we can see that
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the conditions specified in Theorem 1 is stronger than that
in Lemma 2 with respect two aspects. First, in Theorem 1,
it is required that for ∀v ∈ Vδ , there exists one desired
Kv . This is for the purpose of making v Top-K inferable.
Second, the required min Γu⊕w is stronger in Theorem 1 than
that in Lemma 2. This can be explained from the statistical
perspective. In Lemma 2, the objective is make one user
statistically Top-K inferable while in Theorem 1, the objective
is make all the users in Vδ statistically Top-K inferable
(simultaneously).
If the specified conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied, an
interesting question is how to design a M to make V (δ,K)-
inferable. An preliminary implementation of M can be built
using the procedure in Algorithm 2: for each user v in V ,
we use Algorithm 2 to find a Kv for it. Then, by the similar
argument as in Lemma 2, we can conclude that V is (δ,K)-
inferable under M.
In this subsection, we conduct the FDI quantification under
the assumption that each feature function is binary. Apparently,
this assumption may not hold in many real applications.
Nevertheless, the quantification in this subsection can shed
light on sophisticated FDI analysis. In the following subsec-
tions, we consider general FDI quantification by removing this
assumption.
C. General Quantification: From the Distance Perspective
In the previous FDI quantification, we assume that ∀f i ∈ F ,
f i is a binary function, i.e., f i ∈ {0, 1}. Although this
assumption holds in many real applications (e.g., linkage
attacks and data de-anonymization attacks), f i may not be
a binary function in many other applications. Therefore, in
the following FDI quantification, we assume that f i can be
any function with a real-value output. Furthermore, given
F = {f1, f2, · · · , fN}, an inference model M may assign
different weights to each feature (usually, the weights are
learned from the features of the training data, i.e., F(U)).
To characterize this situation, we model that each feature
f i in F corresponds to a weight value in M, which can
be obtained by a weight function wi. In addition, to make
our FDI quantification sufficiently general and meanwhile
mathematically tractable, we model the correlation between
the feature function f i and the weight function wi by another
function g(f i, wi), i.e., g(·, ·) is a function defined on f i and
wi 5. Now, for a user x ∈ V (or x ∈ U ), we have its feature
vector as
−−−→F(x) =< g(f ix, wix)|1 ≤ i ≤ N >, where g(f ix, wix)
is the function defined on the feature function f ix and the
weight function wix of x.
Given M learned from U , we quantify the FDI of V using
M. For instance, V could be the new monitored network
traffic or the new collected web search data. For v ∈ V , to
infer v to some user in U (or the data in U generated by the
same user) or to determine whether v is a new user (or the
5Here, to make our model sufficiently general, we do not specify the
dedicated definition of g(·, ·). In a specifical application, g(·, ·) can be
specified accordingly. For instance, we may have g(f i, wi) = wi · f i as
in a linear regression model.
data generated by a new user), two fundamental approaches
are usually employed in M: distance-based approach and
distribution-based approach [1]-[8]. In the distance-based
approach, M computes the feature distance between v and
each u in U , i.e., the distance between
−−−→F(v) and −−−→F(u) for
u ∈ U . Then, M infers v to a subset of candidates in U
(either has the minimum or the maximum distance value).
In the distribution-based approach, M computes the feature
distribution similarity between v and each u in U , i.e., the
distribution similarity between
−−−→F(v) and −−−→F(u) for u ∈ U .
Then, M infers v to a subset of candidates in U (usually, the
users in U who have the most similar feature distributions
with that of v). In this paper, we quantify the FDI for
both approaches. Specifically, in this subsection, we focus on
distance-based FDI quantification.
To facilitate our quantification, we first make the following
definitions and assumptions. For x, y ∈ U ∪V , we define their
feature distance as Dx,y . In practice, Dx,y can be defined in an
application-oriented manner. For instance, Dx,y can be defined
using the ℘-norm distance as follows:
Dx,y = (
N∑
i=1
|g(f ix, wix)− g(f iy, wiy)|℘)1/℘.
Let E(·) be the expectation/mean value of a random variable.
Then, we define the expectation value of Dx,y as µx,y =
E(Dx,y). Furthermore, we assume that Dx,y ∈ [0, ζx,y], i.e.,
the feature distance between x and y is lower bounded by
0 (which is an intuitive assumption) and upper bounded by
some value ζx,y ≥ 0. Now, for v ∈ V and u,w ∈ U , suppose
that v ' u and v 6= w. We quantify the inferability of v with
respect to u and w in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. (1) When µv,u < µv,w, v is inferable if
min{ 1ζ2v,u ,
1
2ζ2v,w
} ≥ 2(2 lnN+1)(µv,w−µv,u)2 ; (2) When µv,u > µv,w, v is
inferable if min{ 12ζ2v,u ,
1
ζ2v,w
} ≥ 2(2 lnN+1)(µv,u−µv,w)2 .
Proof: We start from proving the first conclusion. Let
X =
µv,u+µv,w
2 , ξ1 =
µv,w−µv,u
2µv,u
, and ξ2 =
µv,w−µv,u
2µv,w
. When
µv,u < µv,w, we have
Pr(Dv,u ≥ Dv,w)
≤ Pr(Dv,u ≥ X) + Pr(Dv,w ≤ X)
= Pr(Dv,u ≥ (1 + ξ1)µv,u) + Pr(Dv,w ≤ (1− ξ2)µv,w).
Applying Chernoff bound (as shown in Lemma 7 in the
Appendix), we have
Pr(Dv,u ≥ Dv,w)
≤ exp(−2ξ
2
1µ
2
v,u
ζ2v,u
) + exp(−ξ
2
2µ
2
v,w
ζ2v,w
)
= exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
2ζ2v,u
) + exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
4ζ2v,w
)
≤ max{2 exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
2ζ2v,u
), 2 exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
4ζ2v,w
)}
≤ 2 exp(−2 lnN − 1) < 1/N2.
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According to the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we have Pr(Dv,u ≥
Dv,w)
N→∞
= 0 when µv,u < µv,w, i.e., Pr(Dv,u <
Dv,w)
N→∞
= 1. Therefore, by comparing the feature distance,
we can distinguish v from u and w, i.e., v is inferable with
respect to u and w.
Now, we prove the second conclusion. When µv,u > µv,w,
Let X = µv,u+µv,w2 , ξ1 =
µv,u−µv,w
2µv,u
, and ξ2 =
µv,u−µv,w
2µv,w
.
Then, we have
Pr(Dv,u ≤ Dv,w)
≤ Pr(Dv,u ≤ X) + Pr(Dv,w ≥ X)
= Pr(Dv,u ≤ (1− ξ1)µv,u) + Pr(Dv,w ≥ (1 + ξ2)µv,w).
Applying Chernoff bound, we have
Pr(Dv,u ≤ Dv,w)
≤ exp(−ξ
2
1µ
2
v,u
ζ2v,u
) + exp(−2ξ
2
2µ
2
v,w
ζ2v,w
)
= exp(−µ
2
v,u
ζ2v,u
· (µv,u − µv,w)
2
4µ2v,u
)
+ exp(−2µ
2
v,w
ζ2v,w
· (µv,u − µv,w)
2
4µ2v,w
)
= exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
4ζ2v,u
) + exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
2ζ2v,w
)
≤ max{2 exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
4ζ2v,u
), 2 exp(− (µv,w − µv,u)
2
2ζ2v,w
)}
≤ 2 exp(−2 lnN − 1) < 1/N2.
Thus, we have Pr(Dv,u ≤ Dv,w) N→∞= 0, i.e., Pr(Dv,u >
Dv,w)
N→∞
= 1. Therefore, v is inferable with respect to u and
w by comparing the feature distance. 2
In Lemma 3, we quantify the feature distance-based FDI
conditions of v with respect to u and w. In fact, the proof of
Lemma 3 corresponds to an implementation of M: when the
specified conditions are satisfied, using a procedure as shown
in Algorithm 1 can make v inferable with respect to u and
w (now, we should change Γ·⊕· to D·,·). Also, M can be
implemented using other techniques, e.g., [1]-[8]. When the
conditions are satisfied, as long asM is an increasing function
on D·,·, M can successfully infer v with respect to u and w.
Now, based on Lemma 3, we study the Top-K inferability
of v ∈ V with respect to U . Again, we assume that ∃u ∈ U
such that v ' u. The Top-K FDI of v is quantified in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. v is Top-K inferable if ∃Kv ⊆ U such that
|Kv| ≥ n −K, µv,u 6= µv,x for ∀x ∈ Kv , and min{ 1ζ2v,x |x ∈
{u} ∪ Kv} ≥ 8 lnN+4 ln 2θnµmin , where θ =
|Kv|
n and µmin =
min{(µv,u − µv,x)2|x ∈ Kv}.
Proof: To prove this lemma, it is sufficient to prove that
∃M such that M(v : U) = Kv , u ∈ Kv , and |Kv| ≤ K. Let
E be the event that ∃w ∈ Kv , v is not inferable with respect
to {u,w}. Then,
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
w∈Kv
v is not inferable with respect to {u,w})
≤
∑
w∈Kv
Pr(v is not inferable with respect to {u,w}).
Since µv,u 6= µv,x for ∀x ∈ Kv and based on Lemma 1,
we have Pr(v is not inferable with respect to {u,w}) ≤
2 exp(−2 lnN − ln 2θn) (this can be proven by considering
µv,u > µv,w and µv,u < µv,w respectively). Therefore, we
have
Pr(E) ≤
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(−2 lnN − ln 2θn)
= 2θn exp(−2 lnN − ln 2θn) = 1/N2.
Therefore, Pr(E) N→∞= 0, which implies that Pr(∀w ∈ Kv, v
is inferable with respect to {u,w}) N→∞= 1.
Now, letM be the procedure as shown in Algorithm 2 while
changing Γv⊕· to Dv⊕·. Based on our proof, we conclude that
the obtained Kv of Algorithm 2 satisfies that u ∈ Kv and
Kv ≤ K (actually, Kv = K). 2
In Lemma 4, we quantified the conditions for a user v ∈ V
to be Top-K inferable. Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we
can quantify the (δ,K)-inferability of V . We show the result
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let Vδ be any subset of V˜ with |Vδ| = δm˜.
V is (δ,K)-inferable if for ∀v ∈ Vδ , ∃Kv ⊆ U such that
|Kv| = n −K, µv,u 6= µv,x for ∀x ∈ Kv , and min{ 1ζ2v,x |x ∈
{u} ∪ Kv} ≥ 8 lnN+4 ln 2δθm˜nµmin , where v ' u ∈ U , θ = n−Kn
and µmin = min{(µv,u − µv,x)2|x ∈ Kv}.
Proof: To prove this theorem, we take a similar approach
as in proving Theorem 1. Let E be the event that ∃v ∈ Vδ , v
is not Top-K inferable. Then, we have
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
v∈Vδ
v is not Top−K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(v is not Top−K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
2 exp(−2 lnN − ln 2δθm˜n)
=
∑
v∈Vδ
2θn exp(−2 lnN − ln 2δθm˜n)
= 2δθm˜n · exp(−2 lnN − ln 2δθm˜n)
= 1/N2.
Therefore, Pr(E) N→∞= 0, which implies that Pr(∀v ∈ Vδ, v
is Top-K inferable) N→∞= 1, i.e., V is (δ,K)-inferable. 2
In Theorem 2, we quantify the feature distance-based
(δ,K)-FDI of V . When the specified conditions are satisfied, a
M can be constructed on top of the procedure in Algorithm 2
(changing the Γx⊕y-items to the Dx,y-items): call Algorithm 2
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for each user v ∈ V . Then, according to the similar argument
as in Lemma 2, we can show that V is (δ,K)-inferable under
M. Again, since the conditions quantified in Theorem 2 (as
well as in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4) are sufficient while not
necessary, it is possible to design some sophisticated M to
achieve better inference performance.
D. General Quantification: From the Distribution Perspective
In the previous subsection, we conduct the FDI quantifica-
tion for the applications that M employs a feature distance-
based inference model. In many other applications, M may
employ a feature distribution-based inference model [1]-[8],
i.e., determine whether v ∈ V and u ∈ U are the same user (or
the data generated by the same user) according to the feature
distribution similarity of v and u. To provide the theoretical
foundation for this kind of inference models, we quantify the
feature distribution-based FDI in this subsection.
For v ∈ V and u ∈ U , there are many approaches to
measure the distribution similarity of
−−−→F(v) =< g(f iv, wiv)|i =
1, 2, · · · , N > and −−−→F(u) =< g(f iu, wiu)|i = 1, 2, · · · , N >.
Among them, one of the most widely adopted approaches is
the Cosine-similarity based method [2][4][5][7]. Therefore, we
focus on quantifying the Cosine similarity-based FDI in this
paper. Our technique is expected to shed light on the FDI quan-
tification based on other distribution similarity measurements.
Before the quantification, we formally define the Cosine
similarity first. Let x, y ∈ V ∪ U , −−−→F(x) =< g(f ix, wix)|i =
1, 2, · · · , N >, and −−−→F(y) =< g(f iy, wiy)|i = 1, 2, · · · , N >.
Furthermore, let x = ||−−−→F(x)|| =
√
N∑
i=1
(g(f ix, w
i
x))
2 be the
magnitude of a vector and gix = g(f
i
x, w
i
x). Then, we define
the feature distribution similarity between x and y as
cos(x, y) =
−−−→F(x) · −−−→F(y)
xy
=
∑N
i=1 g
i
x × giy
x× y ,
where the · is the dot product here.
Now, given v ∈ V and u,w ∈ U , we assume that v ' u and
v 6= w. We start our quantification from the scenario that v is
inferable with respect to {u,w}. Let Xi and X be two random
variables such that Xi = giv(wg
i
u − ugiw) and X =
N∑
i=1
Xi.
Furthermore, we assume that Xi ∈ [l, h]. Then, we have the
following lemma to quantify the inferability of v with respect
to {u,w}.
Lemma 5. v is inferable with respect to {u,w} if µ ≥
(h−l)√2N lnN
ξ , where µ = E(X) is the expectation value of
X and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant value.
Proof: To prove this lemma, statistically, it is sufficient
to prove that Pr(cos(v, u) > cos(v, w)) = Pr(cos(v, u) −
cos(v, w) > 0) → 1 as N → ∞. According to the Cosine
similarity definition, we have
cos(v, u)− cos(v, w) =
∑N
i=1 g
i
vg
i
u
vu
−
∑N
i=1 g
i
vg
i
w
vw
=
w
∑N
i=1 g
i
vg
i
u − u
∑N
i=1 g
i
vg
i
w
vuw
=
∑N
i=1 g
i
v(wg
i
u − ugiw)
vuw
=
X
vuw
.
Therefore, to prove Pr(cos(v, u)− cos(v, w) > 0) N→∞→ 1, it
is equivalent to prove that Pr(X > 0) N→∞→ 1. Now, instead
of proving Pr(X > 0) N→∞→ 1 directly, we prove Pr(X ≤
)
N→∞→ 0, where  ∈ (0, (1 − ξ)µ) is some constant value.
According to the Chernoff bound, we have
Pr(X ≤ ) ≤ Pr(X ≤ (1− ξ)µ)
≤ exp(− ξ
2µ2
N(h− l)2 )
≤ 1/N2.
Thus, Pr(X ≤ ) N→∞→ 0, i.e., Pr(cos(v, u) − cos(v, w) >
0)
N→∞→ 1, which implies v is inferable with respect to {u,w}.
2
In Lemma 5, we quantify the inferability of v with respect
to {u,w}. Following the proof of the lemma, a M can be
easily constructed such that M(v, {u,w}) = {u} when the
specified conditions are satisfied: M simply returns the one
who has a higher feature distribution similarity with v. Based
on Lemma 5, we can further quantify the Top-K inferability
of v. The result is shown in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. v is Top-K inferable if µ ≥ (h−l)
√
N(lnN2θn)
ξ ,
where µ = E(X), θ = n−Kn , and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant
value.
Proof: This lemma can be proven based on Lemma 5. Let
Kv be any subset of U such that |Kv| = n−K and u /∈ Kv .
Then, we first prove that Pr(∀w ∈ Kv, cos(v, u)−cos(v, w) >
0)
N→∞→ 1. Let E be the event that ∃w ∈ Kv such that
cos(v, u) ≤ cos(v, w). Then, applying Lemma 5, we have
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
w∈Kv
cos(v, u) ≤ cos(v, w))
≤
∑
w∈Kv
Pr(cos(v, u) ≤ cos(v, w))
≤
∑
w∈Kv
exp(− ξ
2µ2
N(h− l)2 )
≤
∑
w∈Kv
exp(− ln θnN2)
= θn exp(− ln θnN2) = 1/N2.
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Therefore, we have Pr(∀w ∈ Kv, cos(v, u) − cos(v, w) >
0)
N→∞→ 1. Now, we design aM for v to be Top-K inferable.
Similar to the one in Algorithm 2, we can design a M under
which the users in U who have the Top-K feature distribution
similarity scores (Cosine similarity scores) with v are returned
as Kv . Then, based on our proof, we have u ∈ Kv . 2
In Lemma 6, the feature distribution-based Top-K infer-
ability of v is quantified. When the specified conditions are
satisfied, we also discussed how to implementM in the proof.
Based on Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 we can quantify the (δ,K)-
inferability of V . The result is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. V is (δ,K)-inferable if µ ≥ (h−l)
√
N ln(δθm˜nN2)
ξ ,
where θ = n−Kn and and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant value.
Proof: Let Vδ be any subset of V˜ with size δm˜. To prove
this theorem, it is sufficient to prove that all the users in Vδ
are Top-K inferable. Let E be the event that ∃v ∈ Vδ such
that v cannot be Top-K inferable. Then, we have
Pr(E) = Pr(
⋃
v∈Vδ
v is not Top-K inferable)
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
Pr(v is not Top-K inferable).
According to Lemma 6, we have
Pr(E) ≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
exp(− ξ
2µ2
N(h− l)2 )
≤
∑
v∈Vδ
∑
w∈Kv
exp(− ln(δθm˜N3))
= δm˜ · θn · exp(− ln(δθm˜nN2))
= 1/N2.
Therefore, we have Pr(E) N→∞→ 0, i.e., statistically, all the
users in Vδ are (δ,K)-inferable. 2
In Theorem 3, we quantify the feature distribution
similarity-based (δ,K)-FDI of V . When the specified con-
ditions are satisfied, we can also design a M using the one
shown in Lemma 6: finding the Kv for each user v ∈ V using
the M shown in Lemma 6. According to our proof, we can
see that V is (δ,K)-inferable under such a M. Furthermore,
similar to that in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the conditions
in Theorem 3 are sufficient while not necessary. Therefore,
a sophisticated M could be implemented to improve the
inference performance. Here, our FDI quantification can serve
as a theoretical baseline to facilitate and guide the design of
better inference models.
E. Discussion: Inferring New User/Data
In the previous subsections, we focus on quantifying the
feature distance and distribution based FDI of the users that
appear in both the training data U and the target data V .
In reality, it is possible that there are some new users/data
that appear in V while not in U . Formally, it is possible that
∃v′ ∈ V while @u ∈ U such that v′ ' u. In this case, an
ideal inference model M will infer v′ as a new user (or data
generated by a new user), e.g., an intruder in network forensics
applications [1][4]. In practical inference models [1]-[8], a user
v′ in V is inferred as a new user (or data generated by a new
user) if the feature distance Dv′,u is larger than a threshold
for ∀u ∈ U , or the feature distribution similarity cos(v′, u) is
smaller than a threshold for ∀u ∈ U .
Theoretically, it is challengeable (or, impossible) to quantify
the precise inferability of a new user v′ ∈ V in general with
statistical guarantee (that is why an inference system has false
positive and false negative). The reason is that theoretically,
the feature characteristics of a new user (data generated by
a new user) might be arbitrarily similar to an existing user
(e.g., the network intruders keep improving their camouflaging
techniques). Nevertheless, our FDI quantification still has
meaning implications for inferring new users. For x ∈ V ,
y ∈ U , and x ' y, let µ∗d = E(Dx,y) when M is a feature
distance based model and µ∗s = E(cos(x, y)) when M is a
feature distribution similarity based model. Then, when Dv′,u
is significantly apart from µ∗d or µ
∗
s depending onM (distance
or distribution based), v′ can be inferred as a new user (the data
generated by a new user) with a higher confidence, i.e., µ∗d or
µ∗s can be set as the threshold values in practical applications.
The behind-the-scene reason for this fact can be explained by
the following corollary, which is a direct result of the Chernoff
bound.
Corollary 3. (1) Let Dmin = min{Dv′,x|v′ ∈ V, x ∈ U}
and Dmax = max{Dv′,x|v′ ∈ V, x ∈ U}. When µ∗d ∈ [0, ζ]
and µ∗d ≥ ζ
√
2 lnN
ξ , v
′ is a new user if Dmin ≥ (1 + ξ)µ∗d
or Dmax ≤ (1 − ξ)µ∗d for all ξ > 0. (2) Let Cmax =
max{cos(v′, x)|v′ ∈ V, x ∈ U}. When µ∗s ∈ [l, h] and
µ∗s ≥ (h−l)
√
2 lnN
ξ , v
′ is a new user if Cmax ≤ (1 − ξ)µ∗s
for all ξ > 0.
In practice, the accurate value of µ∗d or µ
∗
s is usually difficult
to be obtained, if not impossible. Frequently, µ∗d or µ
∗
s can
only be estimated based on the observed data and thus it may
change with more data coming, i.e., the threshold estimation
problem itself is an interesting problem. For our purpose,
we propose to quantify the correlation between the threshold
setting and the false positive/negative rate ofM as one of our
future research directions.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the user inferability of real world
security and privacy applications based on our FDI quantifi-
cation. Specifically, we evaluate two scenarios: network traffic
attribution in network forensics and feature-based data de-
anonymization (as shown in Section II-A).
A. Network Traffic Attribution
1) Data Collection and Analysis: In this scenario, we
evaluate the user inferability of four large-scale network traces
generated by the employees of a large enterprise. These four
traces are collected in four periods of 2014: April 1 – April 30
which consists of the network traffic generated by 5888 users,
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TABLE I
NETWORK TRACE FEATURES.
n N # of user-feature relationships
Apr-Domain 5,888 290,537 3,968,361
Apr-Path 5,888 1,685,439 17,389,051
July-Domain 5,610 391,290 3,739,246
July-Path 5,610 1,855,415 16,010,442
Oct-Domain 5,268 270,604 3,868,538
Oct-Path 5,268 1,741,781 16,895,932
Dec-Domain 5,699 298,490 3,736,956
Dec-Path 5,699 2,159,448 16,926,145
July 1 – July 31 which consists of the network traffic generated
by 5610 users, October 1 – October 31 which consists of the
network traffic generated by 5268 users, and December 1 –
December 31 which consists of the network traffic generated
by 5699 users. For each network trace, it is composed of
three parts: HTTP request headers, netflow measures, and DNS
queries.
Here, we do not consider the network traffic payloads,
e.g., the HTTP payloads, for the following reasons. First,
those data are highly sensitive and using them may cause
some legal issues. Second, although network traffic payloads
may provide more information, using our network traces is
sufficient to infer many users as shown in our experiments.
Finally, as indicated in [1], in most of the common available
traces, they do not have those payloads. Therefore, studying
the common feature-based data inferability would be more
useful and general for security and privacy applications.
2) Feature Extraction: After collecting these four traces,
we extract the features of them. Here, we use the feature
extraction model proposed in [1]. Although we may extract
more features, for our purpose, it is sufficient to extract two
kinds of lexical-based features for our FDI analysis: domain
feature and path feature (tokenized). Basically, these two
features characterize the behaviors of users in terms of what
types of websites they have visited and how they interacted
with the websites. For instance, given a HTTP request
“www.google.com/search?q=ndss+2016&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8”,
we will extract a domain feature as “www.google.com”.
For the path features, we tokenize each path (URL) using
‘?’, ‘=’, ‘&”, etc. as delimiters and employ a bag-of-word
representation of the tokens. We refer to the interested readers
for more details of the feature extraction model to [1]. Finally,
we show the feature extraction results of the four traces in
Table I, where Apr, July, Oct, and Dec represent the four
traces collected in April, July, October, and December of
2014, “-Domain” means the domain features, “-Path” means
the tokenized path features, n is the number of users in the
dataset, and N is the number extracted features. Note that,
for each user-feature relationship in Table I, there is a weight
associated with it, which indicates how many times that a
feature appeared in a user’s trace. For instance, if Bob visited
“www.google.com” 100 times in April, 2014, then the weight
associated with the “Bob – www.google.com/” relationship is
100 in the Apr-Domain dataset in Table I.
Now, we define the degree of each user as the number of
features this user has and the degree of each feature as the
number users that have this feature. Then, we show the user
degree distribution and feature degree distribution of the traces
in Table I with respect to the domain feature and the path
feature in Fig.4 and Fig.5, respectively. From Fig.4 and Fig.5,
we have the following observations: both the user degree and
feature degree generally follow a power-law-like distribution
[11], especially the feature degree distribution, i.e., most of
the users have a small number of features while only a few
users have many features, and meantime, most of the features
only appear in the trace of a few users while a small number
of features appear in the trace of a large number of users.
These distributions together suggest that these features could
be employed to effectively infer the users.
3) Evaluation Methodology: To conduct the FDI evalu-
ation, we basically follow the same process as shown in
Fig.1 and Fig.2. Meanwhile, since we focus on evaluating
the statistically inherent FDI, we also make the evaluation
process mathematically tractable. Following the models shown
in Fig.1 and Fig.2, we first determine the training data and the
testing data. Here, instead of partitioning the raw data into two
parts for training and testing respectively (as in many existing
literature, e.g., [1]), we take another while theoretically equiv-
alent approach: following the FDI quantification in Section
III, we first construct the training dataset by keep all the
users and features in each trace while sample the user-feature
relationships independently and identically using a probability
p 6. Similarly, we construct the testing/targeting dataset using
the same process as in obtaining the training dataset. We use
this approach to construct the training and testing data for
two reasons. First, mathematically, this approach is equivalent
to the traditional method in [1]. In the traditional method,
the raw data is partitioned into the training data and the
testing data and then features are extracted from both datasets.
Apparently, the reason that existing inferring techniques can
work is that the training data and the testing data share
some common features (or similar distributions over a feature
space). Therefore, statistically, we can consider the training
and testing data as some sampling versions of the original raw
data respectively, i.e., each training and testing data partition
method mathematically corresponding to one p here. Second,
using this approach to obtain the training and testing/targeting
data makes it easier to apply our FDI quantification analysis.
We will make more discussions on closing the gap between
theory and practice in Section V.
After obtaining the training and testing data, we quantify the
FDI of the four traces using the general scenario FDI quantifi-
cation technique in Section III. Specifically, for the network
traffic attribution application, most the of existing inference
6It is not necessary to have the training data and the testing data to have the
same group of users or features. If they are not the same, we can either apply
our theory to the overlapped users/features, or make them the same by adding
isolated users/features that only appeared in the other dataset. Theoretically,
different user/feature group will not change the validity of our quantification.
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models are based on feature distance [1][2][3]. Therefore,
we evaluate the FDI using the distance-based quantification
technique here. Following Theorem 2, we can easily construct
an inference model M on top of the procedure of Algorithm
2 as shown in Section III-C. Then, we apply M to quantify
the FDI of each dataset. We also make more discussion on the
implications of our quantification as well as the implications
of the results in Section V.
4) Results and Analysis: Now, we evaluate the FDI of the
four traces following the above evaluation methodology. To
reduce any bias, all the experiments are run 10 times (e.g., for
the same p). The final results are the average of that of the 10
runs. We show the (δ,K)-inferability of the four datasets with
respect to the domain and path features in Fig.6 respectively,
where we set K = 10, i.e., we are targeting a user to be Top-10
inferable. From Fig.6, we have the following observations.
• With the increase of p, δ also increases, which implies
that more and more users become Top-10 inferable. The
reason is that a large p implies more common features
are shared by the training data and the targeting data, i.e.,
there is more knowledge available to an inference model.
Therefore, statistically, more users can be successfully
Top-10 inferable.
• When comparing the domain feature-based data inferabil-
ity (Fig.6 (a)) with the path feature-based data inferability
(Fig.6 (b)), we find that the path features are more
powerful in inferring the users than the domain features.
This can be explained based on the results in Table I,
Fig.4, and Fig.5. First, for each dataset, it has much more
path features than domain features (Table I), i.e., much
more knowledge can be used to conduct path feature-
based inference. Second, the users of each dataset have
higher path feature-based degrees than domain feature-
based degrees (Fig.4), and meanwhile, both the domain
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Fig. 6. (δ,K)-inferable verses p. K = 10 in the experiment.
and the path feature degree distributions generally follow
similar power-law-like distributions. Thus, users are more
distinguishable with respect to the path features than that
of the domain features.
In our evaluation, we also examined the data inferability
with respect to other settings: changing the value of K and
combining the domain and path features. The results are as
expected and we put them in the technical report [12]. Here,
we briefly summarize the results. When increasing K (from
0.05n to 0.2n), more users are Top-K inferable given the
same p. The reason is evident since increasing K implies
decreasing the desired inference accuracy. Statistically, more
users become Top-K inferable. Furthermore, after combining
the domain and path features together, we also have more users
inferable compared to the scenario of applying the domain and
path features separately. The reason is also straightforward
since more features imply more knowledge are available for
inferring users, and thus the inference accuracy is improved.
B. Data De-anonymization
Now, we evaluate the users’ feature-based inferability in the
data de-anonymization application [6][7][8].
1) Data Collection and Features: In our evaluation, we use
three social network datasets, Google+, Facebook, and Twitter,
which are publicly available at the Stanford Large Network
Dataset Collection [13]. The reason for us to use these
datasets is that they are published along with well-defined
user features, e.g., birthdays, education, hometown, languages,
career, etc. For de-anonymization attacks, an adversary may
directly employ these features to de-anonymize users. For our
purpose, we can also employ these features to quantify users’
FDI. We show the statistics of these three datasets in Table II.
By comparing the datasets in Tables I and II, we can find that
the three social datasets have much less features. Furthermore,
for the three datasets in II, there is no weight information
associated with the user-feature relationships.
TABLE II
DATA STATISTICS.
n N # of user-feature relationships
Google+ 107,614 19,044 387,261
Facebook 4,039 1,283 37,257
Twiiter 81,306 216,839 1,245,234
We show the user degree distribution of Google+, Facebook,
and Twitter in Fig.7. Basically, the user degree of these three
datasets also shows a power-law-like distribution (similar to
the datasets in Table I, the feature degree of these three datasets
show a power-law-like distribution either [12]). This suggests
that the users in the three datasets could be inferred (i.e., de-
anonymized here) based on the associated features.
2) FDI Evaluation and Analysis: To evaluate the FDI of
Google+, Facebook and Twitter, we take the same methodol-
ogy as in the previous subsection. We show the FDI of the
three datasets in Fig.8, where K = 10, i.e., we also target
the Top-10 inferability of users. From the result, we have the
following observations.
• Again, with the increase of p, more users become Top-10
inferable in the three datasets. The reason is the same as
that in analyzing Fig.6.
• Google+ is much less inferable than that of Facebook and
Twitter. For instance, when p = 0.8, 13.47% Facebook
users and 44.65% Twitter users are Top-10 inferable,
while only 1.62% Google+ users are Top-10 inferable.
Even if p = 0.9, only 8.34% Google+ users are Top-
10 inferable. This can be explained based on the results
in Table II and Fig.7. First, the user-feature relationship
of Google+ is much sparse than the other two datasets.
Second, the degree of most of the Google+ users is very
low. Therefore, there is not too much information can be
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leveraged to infer the Google+ users.
In reality, it is possible to improve the data de-
anonymization performance using more auxiliary information
(more features). Here, our FDI quantification results can
provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of a data
de-anonymization attack.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we make more discussion on the proposed
FDI quantification technique, followed by pointing out the
future research directions.
A. Theory versus Practice
Motivated by many existing security and privacy applica-
tions, in this paper, we study the FDI quantification problem.
To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first FDI
quantification technique for general feature-based inference
models from both the distance perspective and the feature
distribution perspective. Using our quantification technique,
we also evaluate the FDI of feature-based network forensics
and data de-anonymization applications.
Our quantification is important in several perspectives. First,
our quantification provides the theoretical foundation of many
existing feature-based security and privacy applications, e.g.,
network traffic attribution in network forensics [1][3], linkage
attacks and private web search [4][5], and feature-based data
de-anonymization [6][7][8]. Therefore, for such kind of appli-
cations, our quantification closes the gap between the practice
and theory.
Second, our quantification can be employed to evaluate the
performance of the existing techniques in the aforementioned
security and privacy applications. Note that, we are aiming to
quantify the users who can be inferred with statistical guar-
antee based on their features as well as other users’ features.
Meanwhile, we also provide insights on how to design the
inference model (as shown in Section III). Therefore, the quan-
tification results (e.g., the evaluation results in Section IV) can
serve as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of existing
techniques. For instance, to evaluate the performance of the
network traffic attribution system Kaleido [1], we can employ
the evaluation results in Section IV directly7. Similarly, we can
also employ the FDI quantification to evaluate existing feature-
based query linkage attacks, private searching techniques, data
de-anonymization attacks, etc.
Finally, since our quantification can provide a benchmark
of existing feature-based security and privacy applications, it
is evident that our quantification is helpful for researchers to
study and develop new techniques for these applications.
B. Future Work
In this paper, we take the first step in understanding the
theoretical foundation of many existing security and privacy
applications to the best of our knowledge. Specifically, we
propose the FDI quantification techniques for distance-based
and distribution-based inference models. There are still several
interesting directions to continue the research. First, it is inter-
esting to further generalize our quantification to the inference
models that take account of both feature distance and feature
distribution. Second, in addition to the distance/distribution-
7We can first derive p based on the training and testing data used in Kaleido.
Then, we apply our FDI quantification to derive the inherent user inferability.
Finally, we can use the theoretical user inferability to evaluate the performance
of Kaleido. If Kaleido’s performance meets the theoretical results, we can
conclude that Kaleido performs well. Otherwise, we can also tell the room
for improving Kaleido.
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based models, it is also meaningful to quantify data’s in-
ferability under other models for more security and privacy
applications. Third, it is an interesting and meaningful direc-
tion to develop some FDI-based evaluation tool which can
friendly and conveniently serve the data inferability analysis
for existing feature-based inference-oriented security and pri-
vacy applications.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey the related work. Since we did
not have other literature studying the theoretical foundation or
inferability quantification problem for existing feature-based
security and privacy applications to the best of our knowledge,
we focus on briefly summarizing the applications that our FDI
quantification can be applied to.
User-System Interaction Trace Attribution. In [1], Wang
et al. designed a network traffic attribution system Kaleido.
Kaleido leverages a class of inductive discriminant models
to extract user- and context-aware features of network traffic
and then build an efficient inference model to conduct real
time traffic attribution over high-volume network traces. An-
other feature-based network forensics application is [3], where
Neasbitt et al. proposed ClickMiner, a novel system that aims
to automatically reconstruct user-browser interactions from
network traces. A comprehensive survey on network trace-
based forensic frameworks can be found in [14].
In addition to network traffic-based forensic applications,
there are also many other trace attribution-based security
and privacy applications. For instance, in [15], Bergadano
et al. proposed to employ keystroke dynamics (traces) to
perform user authentication; in [16], Monrose et al. designed
a technique to reliably generate a cryptographic key from a
user’s voice while speaking a password; and in [17], Zheng et
al. implemented an efficient user verification system based on
mouse movement traces.
Linkage Attacks and Privacy-preserving Web Search. In [4],
Gervais proposed a quantitative framework to understand the
web-search privacy given adversary’s background knowledge
and attacks. In [18], Peddinti and Saxena analyzed whether
query obfuscation can preserve users’ privacy when against
an adversarial search engine. In [19], Jones presented attacks
to users’ query logs and broke users’ privacy. Recently, Balsa
et al. presented a SoK paper on linkage attacks and privacy-
preserving web search [5].
Feature-based Data De-anonymization. In [6], Caliskan-
Islam et al. presented a novel data de-anonymization attack
to programmers leveraging the code stylometry. Afroz et al.
presented another stylometry-based de-anonymization attack
in [7], by which they can identify anonymous authors of
anonymous texts. In [8], Narayanan and Shmatikov presented
a new class of statistical de-anonymization attacks to high-
dimensional micro-data, e.g., recommendation data, transac-
tion data, and so on. An off-line de-anonymization attack of
bubble forms is presented in [20] by Calandrino et al.
Remark. In addition to the aforementioned security and
privacy applications, there are also other applications, e.g.,
feature-based malware detection systems and intrusion detec-
tion systems, that our quantification can be applicable for
analysis. Although we have many feature-based inference
techniques for various security and privacy applications, their
theory foundation is remain unclear. Furthermore, there is
also no theoretical benchmark to evaluate the performance of
existing techniques relative to the inherent performance bound.
To remedy the gap, we conduct the first FDI quantification in
general scenarios from both distance and distribution perspec-
tives.
VII. CONCLUSION
Considering that many security and privacy applications
can be characterized by the feature-based inference problem,
we study the FDI issue in this paper. First, we conduct the
FDI quantification under a naive data model, under which
we demonstrate the conditions to have a desired fraction of
target users to be Top-K inferable. Subsequently, we extend
our quantification to a general data model by conducting
the FDI quantification from both a distance perspective and
a distribution perspective. Our quantification addressed sev-
eral important yet open problems and lies the foundation
of existing feature-based inference systems/techniques. Third,
based on our quantification, we evaluate the user inferability
in both the network traffic attribution case and the feature-
based data de-anonymization case. Finally, we point out the
implications of this research to existing feature-based inference
systems/tehcniques for various security and privacy applica-
tions.
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APPENDIX
A GENERAL VERSION OF CHERNOFF BOUND
The following version of Chernoff bound applies to bounded
variables with any distribution [10].
Lemma 7. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be random variables such
that a ≤ Xi ≤ b for all i. Let X =
n∑
i=1
Xi and set µ =
E(X) (i.e., the expectation value of X). Then, for all ξ > 0:
Pr(X ≥ (1 + ξ)µ) ≤ exp(− 2ξ2µ2n(b−a)2 ), and Pr(X ≤ (1 −
ξ)µ) ≤ exp(− ξ2µ2n(b−a)2 ).
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